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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Warner-Lambert Company sued BreathAsure, Inc. under 
S 43(a) of the Lanham Act based upon Warner-Lambert's 
belief that the trade names, "BreathAsure" and 
"BreathAsure-D," for certain of defendant's breath 
fresheners constituted a false and misleading claim that 
gave BreathAsure an unfair advantage in the sale of those 
products, and injured Warner-Lambert in the sale of its 
breath freshening products. On the third day of the ensuing 
trial, BreathAsure stipulated that scientific evidence 
established that its "BreathAsure" products were not 
effective against bad breath. As a result, the District Court 
permanently enjoined BreathAsure from continuing to 
advertise that those products were effective. However, the 
court refused to enjoin use of the trade names 
"BreathAsure" or "BreathAsure-D" because the court 
concluded that Warner-Lambert had not demonstrated that 
it was likely to be harmed by the continued use of those 
product names. This appeal followed.1 For the reasons that 
follow, we will reverse. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "We review the District Court's conclusions of law in a plenary 
fashion, its findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, and its 
decision to grant or deny an injunction for abuse of discretion." American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 
F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1103 (1995) 
(quoting Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Rhone-Polenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 
1994)). 
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I. 
 
Warner-Lambert is a leading manufacturer of several 
well-known breath freshening products, including Certs, 
Clorets, Listerine, and Dentyne. Those products are in the 
form of gum, mints, and mouthwash. BreathAsure, Inc. 
also markets several breath freshening products, including 
BreathAsure and BreathAsure-D, which are the subjects of 
this dispute. BreathAsure's breath freshening products are 
capsules that are swallowed. For several years prior to this 
lawsuit, BreathAsure, heavily promoted its BreathAsure 
products as being effective against bad breath. The theme 
of much of the advertising was that the capsules worked 
effectively at the source of bad breath and were, therefore, 
superior to products that simply masked or covered bad 
breath such as gum, mints and mouthwash. One such ad 
contained a series of photographs depicting food, a couple 
appearing to share a tender moment, and a package of 
BreathAsure. The following captions appear beneath those 
images: "if you eat and we all do," "and you want to get 
close," "you need BreathAsure the internal breath 
freshener," "BreathAsure for the confidence of clean fresh 
breath." The label on the package of BreathAsure in this ad 
read: "The internal Breath Freshener All-Natural", and a 
banner across the front of the packaging proclaimed:"lasts 
& lasts & lasts." Much of defendant's advertising tells the 
reader to "stop masking bad breath" with products that 
"just cover-up bad breath." Another of defendant's 
advertisements contained an image of a woman with the 
bottom of her sweater pulled up over her navel and the 
legend: "Fight the problem at its source" with a dotted 
arrow pointing to the woman's stomach. Plaintiff's Exhibit 
101J. 
 
The National Advertising Division of the Better Business 
Bureau investigated defendant's advertising and concluded 
that defendant's claim that BreathAsure and BreathAsure- 
D were effective breath fresheners was not supported by 
any reliable scientific evidence. Accordingly, it 
recommended that defendant discontinue or substantially 
modify its ads for its breath fresheners.2  App. 133, A.138- 
39, A.185, A.189. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Warner-Lambert now represents without contradiction that the 
scientist whose studies defendant relied upon in opposing the National 
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Based upon the unsupported claims made in advertising 
that BreathAsure and BreathAsure-D were effective breath 
fresheners, Warner-Lambert filed the instant complaint 
under S 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S 1125(a), 
seeking to permanently enjoin BreathAsure from 
advertising that its BreathAsure products are effective 
breath fresheners. Warner-Lambert also sought a 
permanent injunction against use of the name 
"BreathAsure" based upon its contention that the name 
itself communicates a false and misleading message. 
Warner-Lambert did not seek monetary damages. Despite 
BreathAsure's claims that its capsules are superior to 
products that merely mask bad breath, evidence produced 
during the instant litigation established that bad breath 
originates in the mouth, not in the stomach. Therefore, 
Warner-Lambert maintains that effective breath freshening 
products must either mask offensive oral odors, or attack 
bacteria in the mouth. A.180. 
 On the third day of the bench trial on Warner-Lambert's 
complaint, BreathAsure stipulated that "[s]cientific studies 
presented in this case demonstrate that BreathAsure and 
BreathAsure-D are not effective in reducing bad breath 
. . . ." BreathAsure also consented to an injunction 
prohibiting it from advertising that its capsules were 
effective breath fresheners. However, BreathAsure 
continued to resist any injunction against the use of the 
trade names "BreathAsure" and "BreathAsure-D," and 
insisted that those names did not violate the Lanham Act. 
 
At the completion of the bench trial, the District Court 
issued an oral opinion in which it held that the trade 
names misrepresented the products' qualities. The court 
stated: 
 
        The Court determines that the name Breath Asure, 
       particularly given its contemplated future use for 
       defendant's products, is indeed deceptive and a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Advertising Division's recommendation that the advertising be modified 
or discontinued has since disavowed his own studies insofar as they 
supported defendant's claim that an ingestible capsule could combat 
offensive breath odor. See Br. for Appellant at 9. 
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       misrepresentation of the products' qualities. It implies 
       assurance where there is no basis for it. It relates to 
       breath; and, together with a residuum of past ads, 
       although discontinued, will inform the market and 
       prospective consumers that it is designed to enhance 
       breath quality and limit offensive odors. While 
       discontinuance of the ads that are the subject of the 
       consent injunction here is and will be significant, 
       particularly in terms of any likelihood of future injury 
       to the plaintiff, that residual impact will be enough to 
       generate product recognition, particularly when the 
       name Breath Asure continues to be used. 
 
        Said somewhat otherwise, I do not accept the 
       testimony of [defendant's main witness] that in all 
       likelihood the future use of Breath Asure, alone or in 
       connection with otherwise benign descriptions, could 
       itself lead to a multiple number of conclusions as to 
       what the product is . . . . Breath Asure's campaign over 
       the last six years has been successful in producing 
       sufficient recognition for the term Breath Asure that its 
       continued use in the market will present to the public 
       once again a product with assurance of breath quality. 
       Accordingly, Breath Asure is deceptive, advising the 
       consumer that there is a sound basis for assurance 
       that this product will freshen or destroy odors in ones 
       breath when there is inadequate support for such a 
       claim. That element of the claim remaining in this case 
       by the plaintiff has been established. 
 
A.13-14. 
 
The court also found that "[t]he [Warner-Lambert and 
BreathAsure] products are in competition in a general 
sense in the breath freshener market." App. at A-25. 
However, despite finding that defendant's claims for its 
products were misleading, the court refused to enjoin the 
use of the two trade names. The court based its refusal 
upon two cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit: Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, 631 
F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1994), and Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corporation v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1994). 
The court refused to presume injury to Warner-Lambert 
based upon defendant's deceptive product name and its 
 
                                5 
 
 
finding that Warner-Lambert and BreathAsure were in 
"competition in a general sense." Instead, the court 
concluded that Warner-Lambert had not met its burden of 
establishing the likelihood of future injury from continued 
use of the product name. The court reasoned that 
BreathAsure and BreathAsure-D 
 
       are in competition [with Warner-Lambert's products] in 
       a general sense in the breath freshener market. But 
       BreathAsure, in this Court's view and as established in 
       this record, I determine is essentially a niche 
       production in light of the manner in which it's 
       consumed and the problems which it is supposed to 
       address. It's in a niche essentially where the plaintiff's 
       products don't go both physically and otherwise. 
 
        This continues to support the Court's determination 
       that the greater likelihood of the side by side marketing 
       of BreathAsure and the plaintiff's products is that 
       consumers will, as they have in the past, add 
       BreathAsure as a compliment to the plaintiff's 
       products, not a substitute, thereby lessening any 
       injury to the plaintiff. 
 
A.25-6. 
 
The court relied upon the following in reaching its 
findings: (i) sales trends for the BreathAsure products had 
decreased in recent years; (ii) Warner-Lambert's sales of 
Listerine, Certs, and Dentyne had increased; (iii) Warner- 
Lambert had not called any consumer witnesses to testify 
that they had switched from using Warner-Lambert's 
breath-freshening products to BreathAsure's products; (iv) 
Warner-Lambert had not presented consumer surveys 
indicating the future impact of BreathAsure products on 
Warner-Lambert's sales; and (v) inasmuch as BreathAsure's 
products were "niche products" that were not used in the 
same manner as Warner-Lambert's products, there was no 
basis to conclude that consumers were likely to switch 
products rather than simply use "BreathAsure" to 
supplement Warner-Lambert's products. 
 
On appeal, Warner-Lambert contends that the District 
Court was clearly erroneous in its findings, and that it 
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erred in not satisfying the necessary burden to enjoin use 
of those trade names. 
 
II. 
 
Our analysis must necessarily begin with Section 
43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act which provides in relevant 
part: 
 
       (a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any 
       goods or services . . . uses in commerce any 
       word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
       combination thereof, or any . . . false or 
       misleading description of fact, or false or 
       misleading representation of fact, which -- 
 
       . . . (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, 
       misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
       qualities, or geographic origin of his or her 
       . . . goods, services, or commercial activities, 
 
       shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 
       believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 
       such act. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(a)(1)(B). To establish a Lanham Act claim 
based on a false or misleading representation of a product 
the plaintiff must show: 
 
       1) that the defendant has made false or misleading 
       statements as to his own product [or another's]; 
 
       2) that there is actual deception or at least a te ndency 
       to deceive a substantial portion of the intended 
       audience; 
 
       3) that the deception is material in that it is li kely to 
       influence purchasing decisions; 
 
       4) that the advertised goods traveled in interstat e 
       commerce; and 
 
       5) that there is a likelihood of injury to the pla intiff in 
       terms of declining sales, loss of good will, etc. 
 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 
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129 (3d Cir. 1994)(quoting U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue 
Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 922-23 (3d 
Cir. 1990)). However, "[i]f a plaintiff proves a challenged 
claim is literally false, a court may grant relief without 
considering whether the buying public was misled." 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck, 19 F.3d at 129. See also Castrol, 
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
In Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking, Co., 255 F.2d 
641, 649 (3d Cir. 1958) we held that a plaintiff seeking 
damages under S 43(a) must establish customer reliance 
but need not quantify loss of sales as that goes to the 
measure of damages, not plaintiff's cause of action. 255 
F.2d at 648. Significantly for our purposes here, we also 
stated: 
 
       [i]n cases of injunction, however, there seems to be no 
       requirement that purchasers actually be deceived, but 
       only that the false advertisements have a tendency to 
       deceive. This seems to be the result desired by 
       Congress in that Section 43(a) confers a right of action 
       upon any person who `believes that he is or is likely to 
       be damaged' by defendant's practices. While it would 
       be going too far to read the requirement of customer 
       reliance out of this section so far as damages are 
       concerned, we believe that this is a recognition that, as 
       with most equitable relief by way of injunction, Section 
       43(a) may be asserted upon a showing of likelihood of 
       damage without awaiting the actuality. 
 
Parkway Baking Co., 255 F.2d at 649 (emphasis added). 
 
Here, Warner-Lambert first argued that the District Court 
applied the wrong standard of proof in determining if it had 
established the necessary "likelihood of injury." Warner- 
Lambert argues that, having found that the "BreathAsure" 
product name was deceptive and that the parties' products 
compete, the District Court necessarily should have 
concluded that Warner-Lambert had a reasonable basis to 
believe that it was likely to be injured if the defendant 
continued referring to its products as "BreathAsure." The 
District Court refused to infer a likelihood of injury, and 
instead required the plaintiff to present "some persuasive 
evidence" of likely damage. 
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The District Court compared the proof presented by 
Warner-Lambert here with the proof presented by the 
plaintiffs in Ortho and Carter-Wallace and concluded that 
Warner-Lambert's failure to produce evidence of declining 
market share, consumer surveys or evidence of consumers 
using defendant's products instead of Warner-Lambert's, 
was fatal to Warner-Lambert's claim insofar as Warner- 
Lambert sought to enjoin defendant's use of its trade 
names. See A.22-24. The court stated: 
 
       [l]et us take a look at some of the methods of proof 
       employed in Johnson & Johnson.3  Now, surely they're 
       not exclusive and the mere failure of all or some of 
       them to be present in the case at bar is not itself fatal. 
       But they are indicative at least of the type of evidence 
       upon which this claim might be sustained that are 
       absent here. 
 
A.22. The court then referred to the consumer surveys, and 
consumer testimony that was introduced in Johnson & 
Johnson v. Carter-Wallace. The court concluded,"[t]here is 
no probative, certainly not adequate probative, evidence of 
consumer surveys once again to indicate a likely damage or 
impact upon either the sales or market shares of the 
plaintiff's products by the continuation of the defendant's 
product merely aided by the trade name Breath Asure." 
A.24. 
 
Similarly, the court referred to Ortho as follows: 
 
       The Ortho case also emphasized such things as the 
       absence of market studies and direct competitive 
       advertising, and the conclusion that people would not 
       necessarily switch as opposed to merely supplementing 
       their repertoire of products. So those similarities 
       between the deficient proofs in Ortho and the 
       deficiencies of the present proofs exist. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court referred to Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, 
631 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1980) as "Johnson & Johnson," and "J&J." 
However, we refer to it here as "Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace" or 
"Carter-Wallace" so as to distinguish it from our holding in Johnson & 
Johnson-Merck v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, 19 F.3d 1125 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
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A.24-5. Inasmuch as the District Court based its analysis 
on Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace and Ortho, rather 
than our holding in Parkway Baking, we will discuss those 
two opinions of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. We 
believe the District Court misconstrued the import of the 
analysis in both of those cases. 
 
In Carter-Wallace, plaintiff manufacturer of Baby Oil and 
Baby Lotion sued defendant manufacturer of "NAIR" - a 
depilatory product that was aggressively advertised as 
containing "baby oil." The District Court granted a defense 
motion to dismiss following a bench trial based upon its 
conclusion that plaintiff had failed to prove "damage or the 
likelihood of damage." 631 F.2d at 189. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to decide "[j]ust 
what that burden is and what evidence will satisfy it. . . ." 
Id. The court began by analyzing the historical background 
of the Lanham Act and Congress' intent to broaden the 
scope of liability that had previously existed for commercial 
torts. The court concluded that the language of the statute 
requires, both as a matter of standing, and as an element 
of the substantive offense, that a plaintiff seeking only 
injunctive relief establish something more than a "mere 
subjective belief that he is . . . likely to be damaged," but 
that the plaintiff "need not quantify the losses actually 
borne." Id. Rather, the court reasoned that the burden 
under S 43(a) actually lay "between those two extremes." Id. 
The court's analysis was based upon the language of the 
Lanham Act, which provides a cause of action for "any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged" by the forbidden act. 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a). The 
court held that, 
 
       despite the use of the word `believes,' something more 
       than a plaintiff 's mere subjective belief that he is 
       injured or likely to be damaged is required before he 
       will be entitled even to injunctive relief . . . . The 
       statute demands only proof providing a reasonable 
       basis for the belief that the plaintiff is likely to be 
       damaged as a result of the false advertising. 
 
Carter-Wallace, 631 F.2d at 189-90. 
 
Thus, under Carter-Wallace, a plaintiff must prove that it 
has a reasonable basis for believing that it is likely to suffer 
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injury, and that a causal nexus between the injury and the 
false name or advertisement. The court in Carter-Wallace 
concluded that the District Court had set the bar too high 
by requiring the plaintiff " `to prove the existence of some 
injury caused by' the defendant" as that demands"proof of 
actual loss and specific evidence of causation." The court 
reasoned that "[p]erhaps a competitor in an open market 
could meet this standard with proof short of quantified 
sales loss, but it is not required to do so." Id. at 190. The 
Court of Appeals concluded "[t]he correct standard is 
whether it is likely that Carter's advertising has caused or 
will cause a loss of [plaintiff's] sales, not whether [plaintiff] 
has come forward with specific evidence that [defendant's] 
ads actually resulted in some definite loss of sales." Id. 
 
However, in Carter-Wallace, the plaintiff was contending 
that the defendant's representation that NAIR contained 
baby oil improperly suggested that NAIR was a Johnson & 
Johnson product. Johnson & Johnson also claimed that 
the defendant's claims that NAIR could moisturize and 
soften skin was false, and that those false claims were 
impacting on the sale of Baby Oil. However, since Baby Oil 
was not a hair removal product there was an issue as to 
whether the defendant's product adversely impacted the 
sale of plaintiff 's Baby Oil. Johnson & Johnson attempted 
to address that concern by introducing consumer testimony 
to establish that users of NAIR relied upon that product's 
purported skin moisturizing qualities in refraining from 
using Baby Oil. Thus, the contest there was between a hair 
removal product with baby oil as an additive that purported 
to moisturize skin, and the manufacturer of Baby Oil - 
which was clearly not a hair removal product. That is not 
analogous to our situation because the plaintiff and 
defendant here both manufacture purported breath 
freshening products.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Moreover, the procedural posture in Carter-Wallace is different from 
that in the present case. In Carter-Wallace, the District Court had not 
yet 
 
considered whether defendant's advertising was false or misleading, as 
that was an issue to be resolved on remand. Instead, the District Court's 
dismissal was "granted on the ground that (Johnson) failed to carry its 
burden of proving damages or the likelihood of damage." Carter-Wallace, 
631 F.2d at 188-89. By contrast, in the instant case the District Court 
had already found BreathAsure's advertising to be misleading. 
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Moreover, BreathAsure's advertisements implicitly aimed 
at Warner-Lambert's products. Although BreathAsure's ads 
never mentioned Warner-Lambert's products by name, they 
implicitly told consumers to stop "masking" bad breath with 
plaintiff 's products and start "attacking it at its source" 
with defendant's products. See Castrol, 987 F.2d at 946 
("there need not be a direct comparison to a competitor for 
a statement to be actionable under the Lanham Act"). 
Accordingly, the District Court's conclusion that consumers 
were equally as likely to adopt a belt and suspenders 
approach and use BreathAsure's products to supplement 
Warner-Lambert's is misplaced and is not supported by the 
analysis in Carter-Wallace. There, the court was careful to 
note that, although "likelihood of injury and causation will 
not be presumed, but must be demonstrated," plaintiff can 
demonstrate it with "proof providing a reasonable basis for 
the belief that the plaintiff is likely to be damaged as a 
result of the false advertising." Carter-Wallace, 631 F.2d at 
190. Thus, Carter-Wallace does not support the District 
Court's refusal to enjoin use of the product name. 
 
Similarly, we do not think the District Court's analysis is 
supported by the decision in Ortho. There, the plaintiff 
manufactured two products designed to relieve the effects 
of sun-induced aging of human skin, and plaintiff sued to 
enjoin defendant from advertising that the defendant's 
products had an "anti-aging effect." Plaintiff 's products 
were prescription drugs, and defendant manufactured over- 
the-counter cosmetics. Following a bench trial, the District 
Court granted defendant's motion to dismiss based upon 
the court's conclusion that the plaintiff lacked standing 
under the Lanham Act. The court held that plaintiff had not 
established a protectable interest in the ingredients of those 
of its own products that were purportedly threatened by 
defendant's products. Thus, plaintiff had not established 
that defendant's advertising was likely to cause injury. See 
Ortho, 32 F.3d at 693. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed stating: 
 
       We hold that since [plaintiff's] products are not 
       obviously in competition with [defendant's] [plaintiff] 
       was required to submit proof demonstrating that 
       consumers view [defendant's] cosmetics as a 
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       comparable substitute for [plaintiff's] drugs. Because 
       [plaintiff] failed to do so . . . we affirm the judgment of 
       the District Court. 
 
Id. at 692. It was in that context that the court explained 
that a plaintiff 's subjective belief of injury was not 
sufficient to confer standing under the statute. However, 
the court also explained that the plaintiff need not establish 
direct competition or lost sales. The court also stated: 
 
       "[t]he likelihood of injury and causation will not be 
       presumed, but must be demonstrated in some 
       manner." The type and quantity of proof required to 
       show injury and causation has varied from one case to 
       another depending on the particular circumstances. On 
       the whole, we have tended to require a more 
       substantial showing where the plaintiff's products are 
       not obviously in competition with defendant's products, 
       or the defendant's advertisements do not draw direct 
       comparisons between the two. 
 
Id. at 694 (internal citations omitted). Since defendant's 
over-the-counter cosmetics were not in direct competition 
with plaintiff 's prescription drugs, the court concluded that 
plaintiff 's subjective belief of injury was not sufficient for 
standing purposes because there was no evidence that 
consumers would view defendant's cosmetics as a 
substitute for plaintiff's prescription drugs. The court 
concluded, "[t]he missing link in [plaintiff's] proof is 
evidence that [defendant's] advertising will have the effect 
on consumers that [plaintiff] says it will -- in other words, 
that consumers will see [defendant's] cosmetics as 
substitutes for [plaintiff 's] drugs. In other cases, this link 
has been supplied by consumer surveys or consumer 
witnesses." Id. at 695. "Without such proof, it would be just 
as reasonable to believe that consumers who buy 
[defendant's] products will also buy [plaintiff's] drugs or, 
alternatively, that the type of consumer who buys 
[defendant's] over-the-counter cosmetics is not the type who 
would seek out a prescription drug." Id. at 697. The District 
Court here found this language in Ortho persuasive in 
concluding that Warner-Lambert had to come forward with 
similar evidence to establish that BreathAsure products 
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competed with its products and did not merely supplement 
them. 
 
The District Court synthesized the holdings of Carter- 
Wallace and Ortho as follows: 
 
       How then in a nutshell do the rulings and principles of 
       such cases as J&J and Ortho become translated into a 
       standard or analysis to be applied to the case at bar? 
       The Court determines that in this matter the plaintiff 
       was required to show by at least some persuasive 
       evidence that Breath Asure alone in the future, even 
       with the residual impact of prior ads to some extent, 
       will likely damage or injure the plaintiff in the breath 
       freshener market. And as mentioned before, the 
       plaintiff has not carried that burden. 
 
A.22. However, as noted above, Ortho's discussion of 
consumer surveys was in the context of an inquiry into 
whether plaintiff had standing to sue under S 43(a). The 
standing inquiry was necessary because defendant's 
products and the plaintiff 's products were not in obvious 
competition in the marketplace. 
 
Moreover, Parkway Baking establishes the standard for 
the present appeal inasmuch as Warner-Lambert sought 
only an injunction. As noted above, Carter-Wallace is 
distinguishable from the instant litigation. However, the 
analysis there is consistent with Parkway Baking insofar as 
it applies to our inquiry. In Carter-Wallace the Court of 
Appeals stated: "the statute demands only proof providing 
a reasonable basis for the belief that the plaintiff is likely to 
be damaged as a result of the false advertising." Carter- 
Wallace, 631 F.2d at 190. 
 
A showing of a reasonable belief of injury will usually be 
sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood of injury 
under S 43(a). Clearly, if a plaintiff can not establish that its 
subjective belief of future injury from the challenged 
conduct is reasonable, plaintiff can hardly claim to have 
shown a reasonable likelihood of injury. There must be 
some basis for the subjective belief in order to establish the 
reasonableness of that belief, and that basis will usually 
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equate with a showing of reasonable likelihood of future 
harm under the statute.5 
 
It is uncontested that BreathAsure's claim regarding the 
efficacy of its ingestible capsules is without any scientific 
foundation. The District Court correctly concluded that 
claim was a deceptive misrepresentation that "implies 
assurance where there is no basis for it." A.13. The 
permanent injunction that the District Court entered states 
in part that: "Defendant BreathAsure, Inc. is permanently 
enjoined from claiming, either directly or by implication, . . . 
with respect to BreathAsure or BreathAsure-D . . . that . . . 
it works. . . " (emphasis added). A.1. It did so because 
defendant's claims of breath assurance were literally false. 
Castrol, 987 F.2d at 944. ("If a defendant's claim is untrue, 
it must be deemed literally false"). The court also concluded 
that BreathAsure's breath freshener does compete with 
Warner-Lambert's breath fresheners "in general." That 
should have been sufficient to enjoin use of the misleading 
trade names under S 43(A), and the District Court should 
not have required Warner-Lambert to produce the kind of 
consumer surveys required in Carter-Wallace and Ortho. 
See Johnson & Johnson v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 19 F.3d 
125 (3d Cir. 1994). In Rhone-Poulenc we stated: 
 
       If a plaintiff proves a challenged claim is literally false, 
       a court may grant relief without considering whether 
       the buying public was mislead . . . . If a plaintiff does 
       not prove the claim is literally false, he must prove that 
       it is deceptive or misleading, which depends on the 
       message that is conveyed to consumers . . . . Public 
       reaction is the measure of a commercial's impact . .. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We need not now decide if a reasonable belief will always equate with 
a reasonable likelihood of injury as it is clear that, under the 
circumstances before us now, Warner-Lambert established the 
reasonableness of its belief of future injury if defendant continued to be 
able to represent, through the use of its name, that its products provided 
purchasers with some assurance of fresher breath. The circumstances 
that establish the reasonableness of that belief also establish the 
likelihood of future harm from the defendant continuing to use its name, 
thereby representing its products as effective breath fresheners in the 
"side by side marketing of BreathAsure and the plaintiff 's products. . . 
" 
 
Dist. Ct. at A.26. 
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       the success of the claim usually turns on the 
       persuasiveness of a consumer survey. The factfinder 
       must determine whether the public was, in fact, 
       misled. 
 
19 F.3d at 129. 
 
In Sandoz Pharmaceuticals v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 
F.2d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 1990) we explained that a plaintiff 
under the Lanham Act need not establish that a 
competitor's claims are false or misleading when that is 
apparent from the advertising itself. Here, the District 
Court required Warner-Lambert to introduce the same kind 
of evidence that would have been required if BreathAsure's 
claims were not literally false. However, inasmuch as 
BreathAsure's claim that its capsules could assure fresh 
breath was literally false, Warner-Lambert did not have to 
introduce consumer testimony, marketing surveys or proof 
of lost profits to enjoin use of the BreathAsure trade name. 
 
As noted above, the District Court found that 
BreathAsure and Warner-Lambert "are in competition in a 
general sense in the breath freshener market." A.25. 
However, the court then seemed to eviscerate thatfinding 
by also concluding that BreathAsure was a "niche product" 
that was as likely to be used to compliment or supplement 
Warner-Lambert's products as to replace them. However, 
we do not interpret the District Court's conclusion that 
BreathAsure products are "niche products" as afinding 
that those products do not compete with other breath- 
freshening products.6 Rather, we conclude that the District 
Court correctly found that the parties' products do compete 
inasmuch as both are promoted as breath fresheners; the 
Warner-Lambert and BreathAsure products appear in close 
proximity to each other in stores; and BreathAsure's own 
advertisements implicitly promoted BreathAsure as a 
superior alternative to Warner-Lambert's products. 
 
We also conclude that the District Court's finding that 
the BreathAsure product name is "deceptive and a 
misrepresentation of the products' qualities" was not clearly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Indeed, the court here noted that plaintiff 's breath fresheners and 
defendant's are marketed "side by side." See A.26. 
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erroneous. The District Court recognized that the 
defendant's deceptive ads were likely to injure Warner- 
Lambert and properly enjoined defendant from continuing 
to claim that its products were effective. The District Court, 
as previously noted, enjoined the defendant from making 
those claims "either directly or by implication." However, 
the court then embroidered a loop hole into the fabric of the 
injunction by allowing the defendant to continue to refer to 
its products as "BreathAsure." 
 
Inasmuch as the defendant's products compete with 
plaintiff 's products we can not reconcile the District Court's 
finding that the advertisements were likely to injure 
Warner-Lambert with that court's concomitant refusal to 
enjoin use of these deceptive trade names based upon a 
belief that Warner-Lambert had not shown a reasonable 
likelihood of injury from their continued use. Under 
Parkway Baking, there "seems to be no requirement that 
purchasers actually be deceived, but only that the false 
advertisements have a tendency to deceive." 255 F.2d at 
649. That tendency is evident here. Indeed, it is surely not 
coincidence that defendant selected trade names suggesting 
that those who use the products have assurance of fresh 
breath. 
 
Warner-Lambert demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of 
injury from the advertising that conveyed BreathAsure's 
message, and Warner-Lambert's belief that it would be 
harmed if the defendant continued to refer to its products 
as "BreathAsure" is just as reasonable. The name falsely 
tells the consumer that he or she has assurance of fresher 
breath when ingesting one of the defendant's capsules. 
That is not true. We therefore hold that the District Court 
erred in concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish the 
likelihood of injury necessary to enjoin use of BreathAsure's 
trade names, and that the District Court abused its 
discretion in refusing to enjoin use of those names. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the District 
Court insofar as it denies Warner-Lambert's request to 
enjoin defendant from using "BreathAsure" or 
 
                                17 
 
 
"BreathAsure-D" or any similarly misleading trade name, 
and remand for the District Court to enter order consistent 
with this opinion. 
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